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a b s t r a c t 
Building on Lazear’s skill weights approach, we study the effect of having more or less heterogeneity in 
the training curriculum on the demand for and supply of apprentices. Modernizations of training cur- 
ricula provide us with a quasi-experimental setting as these modernizations can be seen as a relatively 
exogenous shock. We argue that ﬁrms will train more apprentices when they have more choice options 
in the training curriculum because of (1) the higher productivity of graduates who have acquired more 
skills that are relevant for the ﬁrm, and (2) ﬁrms’ higher market power in the wage bargaining process 
with graduates. We test this hypothesis on data on the demand for apprentices in Germany in all occu- 
pations from 2004 to 2014. We ﬁnd that a more heterogeneous curriculum increases both ﬁrms’ demand 
for and the supply of apprentices. 
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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r  1. Introduction 
The dual apprenticeship system in Germany plays an important
role in integrating young people into the labor market and in safe-
guarding a skilled workforce. More than 50% of each cohort starts
an apprenticeship program each year ( Uhly, 2015 ). As ﬁrms can
freely decide whether they provide training places or not, it is im-
portant to understand the incentives and conditions under which
ﬁrms are willing to provide training places. The analysis of the de-
mand for apprentices has so far focused on demographic devel-
opments, the business cycle, and alternative recruitment possibili-
ties on the external labor market ( Dietrich & Gerner, 2007; Maier
& Walden, 2014; Mühlemann, Wolter, & Wüest, 2009; Troltsch &
Walden, 2010 ). However, none of these studies has related ﬁrms’
demand for apprentices to the content of the training curriculum. 
According to the Vocational Training Act (§ 4, 2), training ﬁrms
have to impart a pre-determined set of skills deﬁned in a standard-∗ Corresponding author at: ROA/Department of Economics, Maastricht University, 
P.O. Box 616, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. 
E-mail addresses: jansen@bibb.de (A. Jansen), a.degrip@maastrichtuniversity.nl 
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0272-7757/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. zed curriculum when providing training places in a recognized oc-
upation of the dual system. While some occupations allow for
pecialization opportunities in their training curriculum, appren-
iceship training courses for other occupations are designed as
mono-occupations”, in which every ﬁrm has to teach exactly the
ame skills. However, due to technological and organizational de-
elopments, training curricula are sometimes modernized. A mod-
rnization of the training curriculum for a particular occupation of-
en does not only change the content of the curriculum but also
hanges the number of choice options training ﬁrms have. Since
he 1990s, for example, a tendency toward more heterogeneity
n the training curricula could be seen ( Bretschneider & Schwarz,
011; Demgenski & Icks, 2003 ). Table 2 in Section 4 provides an
verview of the frequency of the different types of curriculum
odernizations. 
In this paper, we use these relatively exogenous changes in the
egulatory framework of apprenticeship training to assess the im-
act of having choice options on ﬁrms’ demand for apprentices as
ell as on youngsters’ willingness to enroll in certain occupations
ithin the dual apprenticeship system. Observing a longer time
orizon one might argue that the contents of the training curric-
la respond to the ﬁrms’ production processes and are therefore
A. Jansen et al. / Economics of Education Review 57 (2017) 52–65 53 
Table 1 
Overview of expected effects of curriculum modernizations. 
Demand for apprentices Supply of apprentices 
Modernization + (H1) + (H3) 
More heterogeneity + (H2) + /- 
Less heterogeneity + /- + /- 
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a  ather endogenous in the long term. However, modernizations do
ot immediately respond to changes in the production process as
hey involve quite an administrative effort and corresponding costs.
s various stakeholders are involved in the process, the exact year
 new curriculum is implemented can be seen as relatively ran-
om. Therefore, we argue that in the short run, observing a time
eriod of about 10 years, the modernizations can be considered
s an exogenous shock, which decreases the gap between required
nd imparted skills from one training year to the other substan-
ially. A more tailor-made training content enables ﬁrms to train
heir apprentices in a way which is more closely aligned to what
he ﬁrm really needs. This will render the apprentice more produc-
ive both during the training period and after completion of train-
ng, whereas training which is closer to the production process of
he ﬁrm is less complicated to organize, something which could
educe training costs. Moreover, a more specialized curriculum in-
reases the market power of the training ﬁrm because apprentices
ho have completed training can only apply their skills in fewer
utside ﬁrms. As a result, ﬁrms are able to pay lower wages upon
he retention of the apprentices, something which increases their
ncentives to provide apprenticeship places. 
From the ﬁrms’ perspective, the positive aspects of having more
hoice options seem to be undisputed. The results of a ﬁrm sur-
ey conducted on behalf of the former German Federal Ministry of
conomics and Labor in 2005 (Ramboll Management, 2005 ) indi-
ate that different aspects of the training curricula, such as content
nd structure, play a crucial role in a ﬁrm’s decision on whether or
ot to offer apprenticeship places. Indeed, 53% of all non-training
rms state that allowing for more freedom in the training organi-
ation would ease the initiation of training ( Schönfeld et al., 2010 ).
emgenski and Icks (2003) also argue that too restrictive train-
ng curricula can be a severe obstacle to providing training. They
how that 54% of former training ﬁrms see the lack of specializa-
ion opportunities as a huge impediment to continue to provide
pprenticeship training. Having choice options in the curriculum is
herefore likely to increase ﬁrms’ commitment to apprenticeship
raining. 
Apprentices, on the other hand, do not necessarily have the
ame interests as the ﬁrms that offer apprenticeships. More spe-
ialized training means that apprentices who have completed
raining have worse chances of ﬁnding a job in other ﬁrms because
heir skills then only match the skill demands of fewer other ﬁrms.
f apprentices are not sure whether they will be retained upon
ompletion of training, a too specialized curriculum may not be
ttractive for them. However, a more specialized training can also
ake the apprentice more productive in the training ﬁrm as the
mparted skills correspond more closely to the ﬁrms’ skill needs in
he production process. If the higher productivity is to some extent
eﬂected in a higher wage, the introduction of more choice options
or ﬁrms could also increase the attractiveness of training from the
pprentice’s point of view. 
In this paper, we explain the development of the demand for
nd supply of apprentices after a change in the number of choice
ptions in the course of a modernization. As long as training costs
o not increase substantially, the number of ﬁrms providing ap-
renticeship training will increase in line with increasing post-
raining beneﬁts. Using data on the demand for and supply of apprentices in Ger-
any for 265 occupations over 11 years, we analyze the effect of
urricula modernizations on training supply and demand empiri-
ally. The information about the modernization of the training cur-
iculum is obtained by comparing the training curricula before and
fter modernizations. In total, 85 modernizations were analyzed.
ur empirical analyses show that both the demand for and supply
f apprentices are positively affected by the introduction of more
hoice options in the training curriculum. This shows that leaving
uﬃcient freedom in the training regulation improves the attrac-
iveness of the dual system for ﬁrms as well as for apprentices. 
Our study contributes to the human capital literature on train-
ng by analyzing the effect of curriculum heterogeneity on the de-
and for and supply of apprentices. The heterogeneity of training
urricula might be an important aspect of the ﬁrms’ willingness
o train. This issue is highly relevant for designing (new) train-
ng regulations, within existing apprenticeship systems as well as
or countries that aim to introduce elements of an apprenticeship
ystem. Taking this knowledge into account can ensure the attrac-
iveness of the apprenticeship system both from the ﬁrms’ and the
tudents’ points of view. The insights provided in this paper can
lso be transferred to other centrally regulated or certiﬁed training
ourses. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we
iscuss the relevant literature that provides the theoretical back-
round to our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the main
eatures of the German apprenticeship system and discusses the
hoice options in training curricula. Section 4 presents the hy-
otheses on the effect of modernizations on the demand for
nd supply of apprentices. Section 5 discusses the data and ex-
lains how the degree of choice options of the curricula is de-
ermined. Section 6 presents the empirical strategy to test the
erived hypotheses and discusses the exogeneity of the curricu-
um modernizations. Section 7 presents the estimation results and
ection 8 concludes. 
. Literature 
While some ﬁrms train because they want to make use of
he productive contributions of the apprentices, other ﬁrms de-
ide to offer training places mainly because they want to re-
ain the apprentices as skilled workers after the training period
 Merrilees, 1983 ). In the former case, ﬁrms actually do not bear
ny training costs as the productive contributions already compen-
ate for the training expenses. In the latter case, ﬁrms regard the
raining costs as an investment, which they can recoup upon the
etention of the apprentices. As rational ﬁrms only decide to train
hen expected beneﬁts exceed expected costs, ﬁrms need to be
ble to pay a wage below skilled workers’ productivity in order to
ecoup their training costs. However, paying a wage below work-
rs’ productivity is only possible when the ﬁrm has a certain mar-
et power over its employee. Becker (1962) showed that ﬁrms have
o incentives to pay for training in general human capital. If ﬁrms
ay a wage below a worker’s productivity after the training, the
mployee would leave the training ﬁrm and ﬁnd a ﬁrm that of-
ers a wage equal to his or her productivity. Firm-speciﬁc human
apital, in contrast, can only be utilized in the training ﬁrm. There-
ore, ﬁrms would be only willing to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
apital. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b, 1999a ), however, expand
ecker’s theory by arguing that in non-competitive labor markets
nder the existence of wage compression, ﬁrms are also willing
o pay for general human capital. Dionisius et al. (2009) showed
hat Germany is such a case, where the compressed wage structure
eads to substantial post-training beneﬁts, and in the same way to
 willingness to incur training costs. As most occupations are asso-
54 A. Jansen et al. / Economics of Education Review 57 (2017) 52–65 
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t  ciated with net training costs (see Schönfeld et al., 2010 ), one can
expect post training beneﬁts for most occupations. 
Stevens (1994) identiﬁes a third group of skills, which she terms
as transferable skills. Although these skills can be deployed in
more ﬁrms, and are thus, technically seen, general skills, the wage
does not have to equal the productivity of the person who has
completed training because of the low degree of competition for
these skills. Occupation-speciﬁc skills are a clear example of such
transferable skills. Occupation-speciﬁc human capital denotes a set
of skills that are merely useful within one occupation. Wolter and
Ryan (2011) explain that these occupation-speciﬁc skills create
monopsony power for the training ﬁrm as they limit the number of
potential outside ﬁrms where trained workers could employ their
skills. 1 As a result, workers’ productivity related to these occupa-
tional skills is not fully reﬂected in their wages. Also Bhaskar, Man-
ning, and To (2002) argue that when employers have some market
power, they may have an incentive to pay for general human cap-
ital as the skilled worker wage will be lower than their marginal
product. The more market power a ﬁrm has, i.e. the fewer ﬁrms
where skilled employees could move to, the more likely ﬁrms are,
ceteris paribus, to invest in training. Smits (2007) shows that, ﬁrms
would only prefer to convey occupation- or industry-speciﬁc skills
if the training was not regulated otherwise. Even if workers paid
for general skills, ﬁrms have no interest in providing workers with
general training because the returns to industry-speciﬁc skills de-
crease with the share of general human capital. 
Lazear (2009) argues that skills can be de facto ﬁrm spe-
ciﬁc, even if they are technically general, when the combinations
of these general skills are speciﬁc to ﬁrms. He terms this con-
cept the “skill weights approach” as each general skill has differ-
ent weights in different ﬁrms. One essential outcome of the skill
weights approach (SWA) is that ﬁrms that use more idiosyncratic
skill weights, i.e. a combination of skills that is very different to
the average combination of skills in other ﬁrms, are more will-
ing to bear training costs as they can pay relatively lower wages
after the training period. Lazear notes that the speciﬁcity of the
skill combination does not necessarily mean that it is speciﬁc
to one ﬁrm. It can also be related to industries, occupations, or
speciﬁc jobs. Translated into occupation speciﬁc skills, this would
imply that ﬁrms training in occupations in which the required
skills are very idiosyncratic are more likely to bear training costs.
Geel, Mure, and Backes-Gellner (2011) test this hypothesis and
indeed ﬁnd that more idiosyncratic skill weights in an occupa-
tion imply higher training investments on the part of the ﬁrms.
This mechanism is supported by the ﬁnding of Hofmann, Dame-
lang, and Schulz (2011) , who analyze the effect of speciﬁcity of oc-
cupations on the probability that workers change their occupation.
In accordance with the concept of the skill weights approach, they
ﬁnd that the more speciﬁc an occupation is, the less likely it is that
employees change their occupation. Analyzing the skill bundles of
80 Swiss VET occupations, also Eggenberger, Rinawi, and Backes-
Gellner (2015) ﬁnd that workers trained in very speciﬁc occupa-
tions are less likely to change their occupation. Further, in case
workers change to occupations with very different skill bundles,
their wage loss is higher than if they change to rather similar oc-
cupations. Moreover, Rinawi, Krapf, and Backes-Gellner (2014) ﬁnd
that, after a layoff, individuals with more occupation-speciﬁc skill
bundles remain unemployed for a longer time period and are less
likely to ﬁnd a job in a different occupation. Also Gathmann and
Schönberg (2010) emphasize that the speciﬁcity of human capital
is due to different combinations of skills, even if the skills them-
selves are transferable. To measure the degree of skill speciﬁcity,1 Also other sources of monopsony power can exist such as a low regional density 
of ﬁrms. they calculate the task combinations of different occupations and
nd that individuals are more likely to switch to occupations with
imilar task requirements. They show that workers who move to a
ore distant occupation suffer from higher wage losses than work-
rs who move to more similar occupations. 
While these analyses focus on the mobility between different
ccupations, mobility within occupations to other ﬁrms is also a
reat threat for the training ﬁrm. The German labor market is
ery occupation speciﬁc and one can safely assume that, unless
n unexpected change occurs, apprentices plan to stay in their
ccupation upon completion of training. Hall (2015) ﬁnds that in
he ﬁrst year after completion of training fewer than 4% of all
pprentices switch to an occupation that is not related at all to
he occupation in which they have been trained. 24% switch to-
ard a related occupation, whereas 72% of all apprentices stay in
he occupation they have learned. For comparison, data from the
IBB Cost–Beneﬁt Survey show that 56% of all apprentices do not
eave the training ﬁrm within the ﬁrst year upon completion of
raining. 2 About 8% of all former apprentices remain in the train-
ng ﬁrm but switch their occupation ( Fitzenberger, Licklederer, &
wiener, 2015 ). Thus, mobility of those who successfully completed
heir apprenticeship training to other ﬁrms within an occupation is
lso of high importance. 
However, also within an occupation, there is quite some vari-
tion in the production process. 3 Firms may have apprenticeship
laces for the same occupation but have different specializations.
n occupation could, for example, need two main skills, but not
ll ﬁrms in this occupation might need these two skills to the
ame degree. Thus, ﬁrms training apprentices in the same occu-
ation could also differ with respect to the weights they give to
ertain skills. Accordingly, Lazear’s SWA can also be applied to the
istribution of skill weights within an occupation. If ﬁrms could
hoose the training content freely, they would only train those
kills that are relevant for their own production process. However,
n the institutional setting of the German apprenticeship system,
trict training curricula dictate the skills the ﬁrms have to provide
uring training. 
Therefore, Lazear’s skill weights approach does not fully match
he settings of the German apprenticeship system. The skills, which
re the main choice variables in Lazear’s model, cannot be freely
hosen in the case of apprenticeship training. However, in the last
ears, modernizations in training curricula have often given more
reedom to training ﬁrms by including more choice and special-
zation options in the curricula, which allow the ﬁrms to train
heir apprentices in a way which is more closely related to their
roduction process. In terms of the SWA, this means that ﬁrms
an choose their skills more in line with what they would do if
hey could freely maximize their surplus. Creating more choice op-
ions in apprenticeship training also means that persons success-
ully completing training can apply their skills in fewer outside
ompanies, which gives training ﬁrms more market power. This
mplies that ﬁrms can retain a higher share of the workers’ pro-
uctivity by paying lower wages, which leads to an increase in
he expected long-term beneﬁts of training for the ﬁrms. As long
s training costs do not increase substantially, the introduction of
hoice options in the training curriculum will therefore increase
rms’ demand for apprentices. 
. The German apprenticeship system 
Apprenticeships in Germany are a combination of work place
raining and theoretical learning in a vocational school. The ap-2 Own calculations on the data. 
3 Even though the variation within an occupation might be lower than the varia- 
ion between occupations. 
A. Jansen et al. / Economics of Education Review 57 (2017) 52–65 55 
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5 For now, it can be assumed that the rent the ﬁrm retains is a constant share 
of a worker’s productivity. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) also argue that for higher 
training incentives it is not necessary that the share of a worker’s productivity that rentice spends about 3–4 days of the working week in the ﬁrm
nd about 1–2 days of the week in the vocational school. The ﬁrm
s, therefore, an important learning venue, in which the practical
kills required for the examination are taught. The ﬁrm and the
pprentice sign a training contract, in which the training occupa-
ion, apprentice pay and training conditions are speciﬁed. By sign-
ng the training contract ﬁrms commit themselves to the provi-
ion of training outlined in the curriculum of the respective oc-
upation (Vocational Training Act § 4, 2). At the end of the train-
ng period, the competent authority, e.g. the Chamber of Industry
nd Commerce for Industrial and Commercial Occupations, exam-
nes whether the apprentice has acquired the practical competen-
ies prescribed in the training curriculum. Moreover, the Chamber
s responsible for assuring the training quality and therefore su-
ervises the training given in the ﬁrm. Although ﬁrms have some
cope in the way how they impart the prescribed skills, ﬁrms have
he responsibility to train the apprentice for the ﬁnal exam. 
The training curricula for the ﬁrms are developed at the na-
ional state level, and are therefore the same for all ﬁrms in Ger-
any. Nonetheless, some curricula provide the ﬁrms the opportu-
ity to choose between different specializations. This specialization
as to be mentioned in the training contract. 
Mono-occupations 4 are occupations without any specialization.
hus, the training content is identical for all ﬁrms training ap-
rentices in the occupation. However, there are also occupations
ith curricula that allow for differentiation. Then ﬁrms can choose
etween training courses with special training content for differ-
nt ﬁelds of activity. For example, in some occupations ﬁrms have
o choose different ﬁelds of application . Even though the concrete
ompetencies that have to be taught are the same, they can be
mparted in different ﬁelds. In other occupations, ﬁrms can choose
riority topics , which take company characteristics into considera-
ion and account for not more than 6 months out of the entire
raining period that lasts between 2 and 3 ½ years. Even more dif-
erentiation is possible in occupations with different disciplines . A
iscipline is a specialization that has to be taken in the third train-
ng year and is also tested in the ﬁnal exam. The highest degree of
ifferentiation within an occupation is obtained by the use of elec-
ive qualiﬁcation units . Usually several out of many possible units
ave to be chosen, which leads to a high number of different pos-
ible combinations within one occupation. In these occupations,
rms have most possibilities to adapt the training content to their
peciﬁc skill requirements. However, elective qualiﬁcation units vary
n the time they constitute of the total training time. In some oc-
upations, they only account for half a training year, while in other
ccupations they account for a full training year. 
At the end of the training period the apprentice receives three
ifferent types of certiﬁcates: one from the vocational school, one
rom the employer and one from the Chamber that is responsi-
le for the occupation. The Chamber issues a certiﬁcate including
nformation on the examination results and the chosen specializa-
ion. The disciplines are even part of the oﬃcial name of the oc-
upation. In this way, the chosen specialization is visible for all
ther employers. According to the Vocational Training Act, the cer-
iﬁcate from the employer has to include information on the ac-
uired capabilities and competencies, which usually also include
nformation on the specialization, and the certiﬁcate from the vo-
ational schools includes information on the chosen specialization
hen the school provides different classes depending on the spe-
ialization. 
When an occupation is not up-to-date anymore, it will be mod-
rnized. The initiative for a modernization of the curriculum may4 In the following, we use the terminology that is also employed in 
he English version of the oﬃcial BIBB leaﬂet about training regulations 
 Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung, 2014 ). 
t
p
a
a
dome from any of the relevant stakeholders such as employer as-
ociations, unions, representatives of the federal states, representa-
ives of the national government, or the Federal Institute for Vo-
ational Education and Training (BIBB). Before a new curriculum
s adopted, all relevant stakeholders have to agree with it. Then,
he relevant ministry, in agreement with the Ministry of Education
nd Research, grants state recognition to apprenticeships and en-
cts the training curricula according to the Vocational Training Act
§ 4,1). 
. Theory and hypothesis 
In this section, we will outline the expected effect of a mod-
rnization on the demand for apprentices in this occupation and
rieﬂy elaborate on the relation between modernizations and the
upply of apprentices. 
.1. Demand for apprentices 
In our analyses, we will differentiate between the effect of a
odernization as such, in the sense of an adjustment of the train-
ng content, and the effect of a change in the number of choice
ptions training ﬁrms have. First, we outline the hypothesis on
hanges of the content of the curricula irrespective of the degree
f differentiation. Second, we discuss the effect of a change in the
umber of choice options. We argue that a more speciﬁc training
urriculum will increase the productivity of the graduates and en-
ble the ﬁrm to pay the skilled workers a relatively low wage after
he apprenticeship. 
.1.1. Effect of changing the content of training curricula 
A modernization of the content of the curriculum always im-
lies an adaptation of the training curricula to technological devel-
pments. Therefore, modernizations align more closely the skills
earned in the training with the skills demanded in the occupa-
ion and thus make apprenticeship training more effective. As a
esult, workers who successfully complete modernized apprentice-
hip training will ceteris paribus be more productive. If workers
nd employers equally share the returns on this additional produc-
ivity, ﬁrms have more incentives to train and workers are more
ikely to opt for a modernized occupation. As long as the wage in-
reases less than graduate’s productivity, 5 the return for the train-
ng ﬁrms increases. This will induce them to increase their demand
or apprentices. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: A modernization of the training curriculum leads to a higher
demand for apprentices in this occupation. 
.1.2. Effect of more and less heterogeneity within the curricula 
Apart from the adaptation to technological development, a
odernization is often associated with a change in the number
f choice options in the curriculum. More choice options would
hen lead to more heterogeneity, while fewer choice options lead
o less heterogeneity in the curriculum. The effect of heterogeneity
n ﬁrms’ post-training beneﬁts can work via two mechanisms: 
- the degree of heterogeneity has a positive effect on the produc-
tivity of apprentices who have successfully completed training; he ﬁrm retains increases. Even if the ﬁrm retains a constant share of the worker’s 
roductivity as a rent, post-training beneﬁts are higher for more productive workers 
s the “ﬁrm obtains a share of this larger pie” (p. 121). Later, we will relax this 
ssumption in the way that the share of the wage in relation to the productivity 
ecreases. Then, the effect on ﬁrm-sponsored training will be even stronger. 
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f  - the degree of heterogeneity has a positive effect on the ﬁrms’
market power. 
Both mechanisms will be outlined below. 
4.1.3. Effect via the productivity of apprentices successfully 
completing training 
In order to explain the effect of heterogeneity on the produc-
tivity of apprentices who have successfully completed training, we
employ elements of the argumentation in Lazear’s skill weights ap-
proach. Similarly to Lazear’s skill weight model, we assume that
(1) a ﬁrm i in a given occupation produces with the skills A and
B, and (2) that ﬁrms employing workers with this occupation need
different combinations of these two skills. The weight for skill A in
ﬁrm i is denoted with λi , which ranges from 0 to 1. λi is a random
variable with the density function f( λi ). 
6 The worker’s production
function Y i in ﬁrm i depends on the worker’s skills A and B, and is
as follows 7 : 
 i = ( A · λi ) ( 1 / 2 ) + [ B · ( 1 − λi ) ] 1 / 2 (1)
Moreover, each ﬁrm has a maximum total training time for an
apprentice, which has to be split between the two skills A and B.
Assume that α represents the time allocation between skills A and
B and lies between 0 and 1. Then, the time available for learning
skill A is equal to α and the time available for skill B is equal to 1 −
α. Plugging in α for A and ( 1 − α) for B, the production function
could be solely written as a function of the allocation of training
time to the two skills: 
 i = ( α · λi ) ( 1 / 2 ) + [ ( 1 − α) · ( 1 − λi ) ] 1 / 2 (2)
The production function with the exponent of one half is de-
signed in such a way that the worker is most productive if the
training time for skill A ( α) equals the ﬁrm’s skill requirement for
skill A λi . The higher the difference between α and λi , the lower
the worker’s productivity in ﬁrm i will be. If ﬁrms could freely
maximize their surplus, they would choose α equal to λi . 
8 
However, in contrast to Lazear’s model, in German apprentice-
ship training time allocation α between the skills A and B is exter-
nally determined by the training curricula. As ﬁrms’ training deci-
sions depend on the expected productivity of the trained workers,
this setting implies that ﬁrms’ training decisions depends on the α
set in the curriculum. The lower the difference between α and λi ,
the more likely it is that the ﬁrm will invest in training. As this is
true for any individual ﬁrm, the demand for apprentices in a given
occupation rises in line with lower aggregated differences between
the skill requirement and the skills prescribed in the training cur-
ricula 
∫ N 
i α − λi , where N is the total number of ﬁrms. 
In a mono-occupation, α is the same for all ﬁrms. If there are
choice options in the training curriculum ﬁrms can choose be-
tween several α, i.e. specialization opportunities. To predict the ef-
fect of a change in the heterogeneity of the training curriculum,
one needs to know in which case total productivity is highest. This
depends on the amount and type of the choice options α and on
the distribution of the production processes of the ﬁrms employ-
ing trained persons in the occupation: λi . Creating more hetero-
geneity in the curriculum will have a positive effect on aggregated
productivity if ﬁrms’ production processes are characterized by a
strong specialization of skills. However, less heterogeneity could
also have a positive effect on aggregated productivity, if all ﬁrms6 In the extreme case, a ﬁrm produces either with skill A ( λi =1) or skill B 
( λi =0). 
7 We here deviate from Lazear’s production function in order to model the de- 
creasing marginal utility of one skill. 
8 The exact speciﬁcation of the formula is not pivotal for the subsequent ar- 
gumentation. It should only illustrate that ﬁrms prefer a training curriculum that 
matches their production process. 
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oraining for the same occupation have a very homogenous pro-
uction process. In such a case, specialization would be counter-
roductive. A modernization which implies a change in the degree
f heterogeneity of the curriculum usually occurs because relevant
takeholders have requested this change. One main characteristic
f the German apprenticeship system is the “consensus principle”
hich means that all relevant stakeholders involved in the ap-
renticeship system have to agree to a new training curriculum
 Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung, 2014 ). Thus, we might expect
hat, when the number of choice options is changed, 
∫ N 
i α − λi is
maller after a modernization than before the modernization. Un-
er this assumption, any change in the degree of heterogeneity
ould lead to an increase in ﬁrms’ demand for apprentices. 
.1.4. Effect via ﬁrms’ market power 
A change in the choice options in the training curriculum has
dditional effects on ﬁrms’ post-training beneﬁts via a change in
heir market power in the labor market for skilled workers. A more
peciﬁc training curriculum creates monopsony power because it
educes the outside options of trained workers in the labor market
s graduates can apply their skills in fewer outside ﬁrms. A signif-
cant share of ﬁrms employing skilled workers in the same occu-
ation will prefer to hire a skilled worker with the reversed skill
ombination. Outside employers can observe the chosen specializa-
ion either on the apprenticeship leaving certiﬁcate, the work cer-
iﬁcate, or the school certiﬁcate. Therefore, apprentices are more
ikely to stay in the training ﬁrm if they have been trained ac-
ording to a more heterogeneous curriculum. This in turn increases
rms’ chances to recoup training investments incurred. 
Moreover, ﬁrms are able to pay a lower wage relative to
killed workers’ productivity. Assuming that—in line with Lazear’s
rgumentation—the graduate’s wage within the training ﬁrm is de-
ermined by a Nash bargaining process, the wage lies exactly be-
ween the graduate’s productivity and his or her expected outside
ption. As the expected value of the outside options decreases in
ine with more heterogeneity in the curricula, the training ﬁrm
s able to pay a lower wage. 9 This increases the potential return
btained from offering training, which will lead to an increase in
rms’ demand for apprentices. 
Both because of the higher productivity of trained workers in
he training ﬁrm and the stronger bargaining power of the ﬁrm,
ore possibilities to specialize in the training curriculum will lead
o higher returns for the ﬁrm after the training period. Therefore,
e derive the following hypothesis. 
H2: More heterogeneity in the training curriculum increases the de-
mand for apprentices in this occupation. 
With regard to the effect of less heterogeneity, we outlined two
pposing effects. On the one hand, assuming that a change in the
umber of choice options leads to a better ﬁt between acquired
nd demanded skills, less heterogeneity increases workers’ produc-
ivity in the training ﬁrm. This would for example be the case if
rms preferred to convey all skills to an equal degree and not to
pecialize in one skill. On the other hand, less heterogeneity will
lso decrease the bargaining power of the ﬁrm, which leads to
igher wages for trained workers. Accordingly, the general positive
ffect of a change in the degree of choice options on the demand
or apprentices would (partially) be compensated by higher wages
nd quit rates. It is not straightforward to see which of these two
echanisms has a stronger effect in practice. Therefore, no clear9 Therefore, an alternative way to test the derived hypothesis would be to calcu- 
ate the wage change when apprentices who were trained in modernized occupa- 
ions change their employers (see for example Fitzenberger et al., 2015; Göggel & 
wick, 2012 ). However, we do not have any information on the wages at the level 
f apprenticeship occupations for the respective time span. 
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12 This also excludes the possibility that occupations that were abandoned are still ypothesis on the effect of less heterogeneity on the demand for
pprentices can be derived. 
.2. Supply of apprentices 
Equivalent to hypothesis 1, modernizations are expected to have
 positive effect on total supply of apprentices as trained appren-
ices will become more productive if a modernization aligns more
losely the skills learned in the training with the skills demanded
n the occupation. I.e., if the curriculum becomes more up to date,
pprentices will be more productive after completion of training,
hich increases skilled workers’ wages in the ﬁrm providing train-
ng. This higher wage makes apprenticeship training in recently
odernized occupations more attractive. Thus, we can derive the
ollowing hypothesis. 
H3: A modernization of the training curriculum leads to a higher
supply of apprentices in this occupation. 
A modernization which leads to more heterogeneity in the cur-
iculum might have two opposing effects on the supply of appren-
ices. On the one hand, more heterogeneity will lead to a better
t between the production process and the training content which
ill make trained workers more productive and will therefore in-
rease their wage in the training ﬁrm. On the other hand, ap-
renticeship graduates will then also become more specialized and
ore dependent on the training ﬁrm. This would ceteris paribus
educe their outside options and the wage they can earn in another
rm. 10 In case of a layoff, the apprentice would be more likely to
uffer a wage loss. Therefore, more heterogeneity in the curriculum
ill reduce the graduates’ bargaining power and their wage in the
raining ﬁrm. This makes an apprenticeship in occupations with a
ore heterogeneous curriculum less attractive. The effect of more
eterogeneity in the training curricula on the supply of apprentices
ould therefore go in different directions, and we cannot derive a
lear hypothesis. 
The same countervailing effects could occur if a modernization
eads to less heterogeneity in the curriculum on students’ supply
f apprentices. If the lower number of choice options leads on av-
rage to a worse ﬁt between acquired and demanded skills, less
eterogeneity will decrease workers’ productivity in the training
rm, whereas less heterogeneity in the curriculum will improve
raduates’ bargaining power as they will then have more outside
ptions. However, even though theoretically the ‘net’ effect of het-
rogeneity in the training curricula on the supply of apprentices is
ot clear, we will assess this relationship empirically. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the expected effects of the curricu-
um modernizations. 
. Data 
.1. Demand for and supply of apprentices 
The data used for this analysis is based on the survey of New
raining Contracts with the effective date of 30th of Sept of each
raining year. 11 It includes information about the number of new
raining contracts and the supply of and demand for apprentices.
he new training contracts are collected by the Bundesinstitut für
erufsbildung (BIBB) from the responsible Chambers, which have
nformation on all new training contracts in their associated oc-
upations. The annual demand for apprentices is calculated by10 In this way, more heterogeneity would lead to a lower outﬂow of trained grad- 
ates to other ﬁrms. Unfortunately, there is no data on the outﬂow of apprentices 
uccessfully completing training to other ﬁrms at the occupational level. 
11 For information about the survey see: http://www.bibb.de/dokumente/pdf/ 
aa309 _ BIBB-Erhebung _ Zusammenfassung _ 201103.pdf . 
i
d
p
r
sdding the new training contracts in the year to the number of
nﬁlled training places the ﬁrms report to the German Federal
mployment Agency. As ﬁrms have to report each training con-
ract to the responsible Chamber, the Chambers are informed on
ll new training contracts. In principle, however, the Federal Em-
loyment Agency might not be informed by all training vacancies
r searches. However, as long the share of not reported training
acancies or searches remains constant a deviation should not bias
he results. The supply of apprentices is obtained by adding the
ew training contracts to the number of applicants who could not
et an apprenticeship place and did not have any other alternative.
hus, our database is a full census of the complete demand for
nd supply of apprentices in Germany. The data does not include
he number of ﬁrms that demand apprentices and the number of
pprentices demanded per ﬁrm. Thus, we cannot say whether the
esults are a consequence of changes in the extensive or intensive
argin of the demand for apprentices. The same holds for the sup-
ly of apprentices. Information about the supply of and demand
or training contracts at the occupational level has been available
ince 2004. 
The data set comprises information on the demand for and sup-
ly of apprentices in all 330 occupations that were recognized in
014. 12 We had to gather information on the development of all
ccupations in order to construct a dataset with comparable oc-
upations over time. Occupations should therefore be comparable
efore and after the modernization. Occupations that were split
nd merged at the same time could not be compared over time
nd are excluded from the analysis. In total, these were eight oc-
upations. When an occupation had a different name in the past
r results from a merge of different occupations, it is linked to its
redecessor(s). In our analyses, we control for possible effects of a
ame change or mergers by including a name dummy as well as a
ummy for mergers. In the event that the occupation has had sev-
ral predecessors, we use the sum of the demand for (or supply
f) apprentices of those predecessors and match this sum to the
ew occupation. 13 All training regulations are published under the
ederal Law Gazette (Ger.: “Bundesgesetzblatt”). 
We exclude very small occupations when the occupation ever
omprised less than 12 apprentices in any of the years between
004 and 2014. Moreover, we excluded eight occupations, which
ould not be compared over time due to a complex restructuring
n the course of a modernization. 14 In this way, we obtain a panel
ata set of 265 different occupations over 11 years. 244 occupa-
ions existed during the whole time period from 2004 to 2014; 21
ccupations were introduced at a later stage and therefore existed
nly during a part of this period. 
.2. Curriculum heterogeneity 
.2.1. Structure of the curricula 
We base the categorization of the degree of heterogene-
ty in the curricula on the structure of the training, which
s deﬁned for each occupation in the training regulation (see
undesinstitut für Berufsbildung, 2014 ). We ranked the ﬁve differ-
nt training structures according to their degree of differentiation.
oing so, we take into account the number of specializations and
he time these specializations take in relation to the total train-n the dataset. 
13 As the data of the new training contracts are gathered by the Chambers of in- 
ustry and commerce and the Chambers of craft, which sometimes incorrectly re- 
ort the old name of the occupation, occupations that were not modernized in our 
esearch period also had to be matched to their predecessors. 
14 This is the case when occupations were split and the split parts were at the 
ame time merged with other occupations. 
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17 See https://www.bibb.de/de/berufeinfo.php/genealogy/nmedpr13 for the histor- 
ical development of this occupation. 
18 The translation are taken from: https://www.darmstadt.ihk.de/produktmarken/ 
aus _ und _ weiterbildung _ channel/ausbildung _ channel/Anlagen _ Artikel/englische _ 
berufsbezeichnungen/2535860 . 
19 In our empirical analysis, the number of apprenticeships of a merged occupa- ing time. The structure with elective qualiﬁcation units, for ex-
ample, allows for the highest number of possible combinations as
ﬁrms can choose several out of many possible qualiﬁcation units.
In contrast, a structure including different disciplines means that
ﬁrms can choose one discipline out of usually three or four disci-
plines. Therefore, the disciplines are mostly ranked lower than the
qualiﬁcation units. However, the internal differentiation is not only
determined by the number of specializations but also by the im-
portance these specializations have in relation to the total training
content. For example, when a ﬁrm can choose between 100 spe-
cializations, but these specializations are only supposed to last for
1 week, they are likely to be not very relevant for the skill ac-
quisition of the apprentice. Therefore, we also take into account
the time these specializations take in relation to the total training
time. As a result, when the elective qualiﬁcation units account only
for a relatively short time period (e.g., only half a year), they are
ranked lower than the disciplines. According to the number and
relevance of choice options, we yield the following ranking on the
degree of heterogeneity for the different curricula structures from
less to more heterogeneous: mono-occupations, ﬁelds of applica-
tion, priority topics, elective qualiﬁcation units (half a year) disci-
plines, and elective qualiﬁcation units (full year). 
5.2.2. Deﬁning the change in heterogeneity 
The amount of choice options, i.e. degree of heterogeneity, can
only be changed in the course of a modernization. The operational-
ization of a modernization is straightforward as the result of a
modernization is always the replacement of an old training cur-
riculum by a new one. We allocated all modernizations into three
groups: (1) modernizations creating less choice options in the cur-
riculum, (2) modernizations that do not affect the choice options
and (3) modernizations that allow for more curriculum hetero-
geneity. 
In principle, changes in the degree of differentiation within an
occupation can occur in four ways. Firstly, a curriculum could be
given a different structure. For example, a change from, e.g., a
mono-occupation to an occupation with disciplines is deﬁned as
a change toward more heterogeneity. 15 Secondly, the amount of
possible specialization options can change within a given structure
of the curriculum (e.g., a ﬁrm can choose between two instead
of three possible disciplines). Thirdly, the time spent on existing
specializations in the curriculum can change (elective qualiﬁcation
units should last 1 year instead of only half a year). Fourthly, when
several occupations are merged into one occupation, the modern-
ization is categorized as less heterogeneity. 16 
In the following, we provide three examples of modernizations
that took place between 2005 and 2014, and explain why they are
categorized into leading to more or less heterogeneity. 
The occupation “insurance and ﬁnancial services broker” was
modernized in the year 2006. Before the modernization, the oc-
cupation was designed as a mono-occupation, which meant that
all ﬁrms training apprentices in this occupation had to adhere to
the same training curriculum and impart exactly the same skills. In
2006, the structure of the curriculum was converted into a curricu-
lum with different disciplines. From then on, ﬁrms had the possi-
bility to choose one out of two disciplines, i.e. either “ﬁnancial ad-
vice” or “insurance”. Thus, this training curriculum entailed more
heterogeneity after the modernization than before. 15 We assume that potential additional options are also used by ﬁrms as the mod- 
ernizations are initiated by the ﬁrms themselves due to changing skill requirements. 
16 We also included a separate dummy on mergers to test for potential separate 
effect of merged occupations. Splits of occupations are not part of our database. 
c
p
q
eA second example is the occupation “designer of digital and
rint media”, which was modernized in the year 2013. 17 The oc-
upation was merged with the occupations “decorative template
aker”, “photographic laboratory technician”, and “photographic
edia laboratory technician”. 18 Thus, after the modernization the
ccupation “designer of digital and print media” was a combina-
ion of four different predecessor occupations. Although the new
raining curriculum allowed for choosing one of three disciplines
“advising and planning”, “conception and visualization”, and “de-
ign and technology”), the new merged occupation allows for
ess heterogeneity compared to the previous four separate occupa-
ions. 19 
The third example is the occupation “wood mechanic”, for
hich the number of choice options decreased. Before the mod-
rnization in 2006 ﬁrms could choose between six different dis-
iplines, while from 2006 on, ﬁrms could only choose between
wo different disciplines (“furniture-making and interior ﬁttings”
nd “construction elements, wooden packaging and frames”). The
odernization therefore decreased the heterogeneity within this oc-
upation. 
The three examples of curriculum modernizations show that
he categorization is based on both the curriculum structure and
he number of choice options within the same structure. Moreover,
ergers of occupations are taken into account. 
The information about the modernizations is obtained from the
IBB database on occupations and their modernizations, which is
vailable online. New training regulations always come into force
n the month of August in the respective year. As the new training
ear always starts in September, all new training contracts con-
luded and reported within this year have to abide by the valid
urricula of the respective year. For example, when the occupation
plant mechanic” is modernized in 2004, all ﬁrms concluding and
eporting a new training contract for training the “plant mechanic”
n 2004 have to train according to the new regulation. 
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix show the respective train-
ng structures before and after the modernizations in the time
eriod analyzed differentiated for modernizations leading to less
 Table A1 ) and more ( Table A2 ) heterogeneity. 
Table 2 provides an overview of how those modernizations in
he different years are categorized. In the period from the years
005 to 2014, 103 modernizations were implemented, whereas
ix occupations were modernized twice (among those were ﬁve
valuable occupations). 20 Thus, in these years 97 occupations were
odernized. For our analysis, we can make use of 85 different
odernizations. Seven modernizations had to be excluded because
hey led to a split and a merge of several occupations at the same
ime, something which impedes a comparison between the pre-
nd post-treatment period. 21 One occupation was merged twice
n the observed time period. In order to compare this occupation
ver the different years, only the second modernization was an-
lyzed. 22 Ten modernizations were excluded because they affectedtion will be compared to the sum of the number of apprenticeships of the prede- 
essor occupations. 
20 For occupations that were modernized in 2004, we cannot compare a pre- and 
ost-modernization period. 
21 A detailed description of the unambiguous modernization is available upon re- 
uest. 
22 In the empirical analysis, this second modernization is deﬁned as the ﬁrst mod- 
rnization. 
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Table 2 
Curriculum modernizations between 2005 and 2014. 
Year Modernizations Less heterogeneity No change in heterogeneity More heterogeneity 
2005 15 6 (3) 6 3 
2006 16 4 (2) 7 5 
2007 5 0 (0) 4 1 
2008 2 1 (0) 0 1 
2009 6 1 (1) 1 4 
2010 8 1 (0) 5 2 
2011 9 1 (0) 2 6 
2012 5 0 (0) 3 2 
2013 12 4 (3) 6 2 
2014 7 3 (1) 4 0 
Total 85 21 (10) 38 26 
Note: The number of merged occupations leading to less heterogeneity is displayed in parentheses in the 
third column. Modernized occupations that were split cannot be compared over time. These occupations 
are not included in the analysis. Moreover, curriculum modernizations for very small occupations (with 
fewer than 12 apprentices) are also not included. 
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i  ery small occupations with fewer than twelve apprentices. 23 From
he 85 modernized occupations, 21 became more homogenous, 26
ecame more heterogeneous, and 38 did not change their struc-
ure at all. As can be seen in Table 2 , in each year at least two
odernizations occurred, with peaks in the years 20 05, 20 06 and
013. 
The Tables A3 and A4 show for each occupation the demand for
nd supply of apprentices in the year before the modernizations
hat lead to less and more heterogeneity, respectively. Table A5 in
he Appendix shows the mean demands which indicate the “size”
f the occupations. The average demand for apprentices in each
raining year over the 265 occupations and the 11 years is 2215.
he demand for apprentices seems to be higher when moderniza-
ions are associated with a change in the heterogeneity of the cur-
iculum (less heterogeneity: 3650 and more heterogeneity: 3492)
n comparison to both the occupations with curriculum modern-
zations that did not entail a change in heterogeneity (1857) and
ccupations that were not modernized at all (1955). 24 However,
he demand for apprentices does not appear to differ much be-
ween modernizations leading to more heterogeneity vs. modern-
zations leading to less heterogeneity. Table A5 also shows that oc-
upations that have been modernized twice tend to be associated
o the highest demand for apprentices. This makes sense as it is
ikely that more important large occupations are more often mod-
rnized. 
. Empirical strategy 
.1. Model 
We ﬁrst estimate occupational ﬁxed-effect regressions in which
e relate the demand for apprentices to the modernizations in
he training curricula. To test the effect of changes in the de-
ree of heterogeneity, we include two interaction terms indicating
hether the modernization introduced more or less heterogeneity
n the training curriculum. The occupational ﬁxed-effect regression
s therefore speciﬁed as follows: 
 ot = oc c o + β1 mo d ot + β2 he t ot + β3 ho m ot 
+ δt dt + γo t o + ε ot (3) 23 From all the small occupations that were modernized in the respective time 
pan, no occupation was introduced in the analyzed time span. Therefore, there is 
o risk of neglecting small emerging occupations. 
24 It should however be noted that the more recent modernizations leading to 
ore heterogeneity in the curriculum remarkably took place in smaller occupations. 
ata are available upon request. 
c
e  
t  
n  
c  
t  
iD ot denotes the demand for apprentices in year t and occupa-
ion o . The indicator variable occ o denotes the dummies for the dif-
erent occupation. The variable mod ot is 1 if an occupation is mod-
rnized and 0 if it is not yet or has never been modernized. Thus,
he parameter β1 estimates the effect of the modernization itself.
ive occupations that were modernized twice in the time period
ere analyzed. For these occupations, we used a second modern-
zation dummy (not displayed in Eq. (3 )). To measure the effect of
hanges in curriculum heterogeneity, we include interaction terms
ndicating modernizations that allow for more heterogeneity ( het ot )
nd modernizations that lead to less heterogeneity, i.e. more ho-
ogeneity ( hom ot ). If the modernization implied a change toward
ore heterogeneity, het ot takes the value 1 in the years after the
odernization and 0 in the years before the modernization. When
here was no change in the structure of the curriculum at all or
hen the number of choice options was reduced, the variable het ot 
s always equal to 0. The values for hom ot are analogous. Thus, β2 
nd β3 estimate the effect of more or less heterogeneity respec-
ively. Thus, the coeﬃcient β1 estimates the effect of a moderniza-
ion, when there was no change in the degree of heterogeneity.
s controls, the following variables are included: year dummies dt
nd occupation-speciﬁc time trends t o . By the inclusion of the year
ummies, we can exclude year speciﬁc exogenous shocks affecting
he demand for apprentices, such as cohort-speciﬁc demographic
hanges, changes in the number of school leavers and business cy-
le effects. The occupation-speciﬁc time trends control for any oc-
upation speciﬁc upward or downward trend in the number of ap-
renticeships. 
Analogously, we also run a regression in which we analyze to
hat extent more or less heterogeneity in the curriculum intro-
uced by the modernization affects the supply of apprentices: 
 ot = oc c o + β1 mo d ot + β2 he t ot + β3 ho m ot 
+ δt dt + γo t o + β4 nam e ot + ε ot (4) 
This regression includes the same variables of interest and con-
rol variables as the regressions on the demand for apprentices.
oreover, we include an additional control variable name ot which
ndicates whether or not the name of the occupation has been
hanged in the course of the modernization. Correspondingly, β4 
stimates potential changes in the attractiveness of the occupa-
ion due to a name change. Krewerth et al. (2004) show that the
ame of the occupation has a signiﬁcant effect on the occupational
hoice of young school leavers. If policy makers choose a more at-
ractive name, a name change might be associated with an increase
n the supply of apprentices in this occupation. 
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26 Usually, the signiﬁcance levels indicate the probability that the estimate is true 
in the population. In this case, we already have administrative data from the whole 
population, i.e. supply of new training contracts. For a description of the dataset, 
see Flemming and Granath (2011) . 
27 The average number of demanded apprentices before the modernizations was 
2741. 
28 This could be expected as excess supply or demand is usually not large because 6.2. Exogeneity of curriculum modernizations 
Even though training curricula should correspond to the pro-
duction process of the employers and, accordingly, modernizations
occur after fundamental changes in the production process, we ar-
gue that both the content and timing of modernizations of training
curricula can be considered as exogenous. 
First, the design of training curricula is not only determined by
employers’ interests. By law, different stakeholders are involved in
the modernization process (employer associations, unions, repre-
sentatives of federal states, the national government, and the Fed-
eral Institute for Vocational Education and Training) . The initiative
for a modernization of the curriculum may come from any of these
stakeholders and all relevant stakeholders have to agree that a new
training curriculum will be introduced (i.e., the “consensus princi-
ple”). Moreover, individual ﬁrms do not have any direct inﬂuence
in this process but are represented by associations. Therefore, large
ﬁrms tend to have more inﬂuence on the curricula modernizations
as small and medium sized ﬁrms are often not part of sector as-
sociations and the representatives of employer associations usually
come from large companies. 
Second, modernizations are not immediately implemented after
a change in the production process. It is a long process until an oc-
cupation is modernized. If social partners request to considerate a
curriculum modernization they have to make a proposal including
the basic aspects of the proposed new curriculum (the ‘benchmark
ﬁgures”) and propose the modernization via their umbrella orga-
nizations to the relevant ministry. 25 After setting the benchmark
ﬁgures with the approval of the relevant ministry, the training cur-
ricula are developed parallel to the elaboration of the framework
curriculum for vocational schools. The draft of the training curricu-
lum has to be commented by the Board of the Federal Institute for
Vocational Education and Training (BIBB). Finally, the regional state
ministries, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the
ministries responsible for the training regulation must give their ﬁ-
nal approval before the ministry responsible for the occupation can
adopt the training curriculum. Usually, the curriculum then comes
into force the following August. Due to the high effort of the vari-
ous engaged parties and the length of the process, occupations are
not regularly modernized. In the 11 years of our research period
only 85 out of a total of 265 occupations were modernized and
only 5 occupations were modernized twice. Moreover, there is al-
ways a considerable and irregular lag between the perceived needs
for a curriculum modernization and its implementation. The ex-
act year of a modernization is therefore quite random. From this
annual perspective, modernizations can be seen as an exogenous
change in the framework conditions. 
One might argue that choice options might have been acciden-
tally introduced in the same year of other unobserved changes that
might also have affected demand for and supply of apprentices.
Such changes could refer to the business cycle or the demographic
situation. By including year dummies and occupation-speciﬁc time
trends, we try to rule out this potential endogeneity. Moreover, in
one of our robustness tests in Section 7.2 , we test for pre-treatment
time trends in the demand for and supply of apprentices in occu-
pations that have been modernized. 
7. Results 
7.1. Regression results 
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the occupation ﬁxed-
effect regression on the demand for and supply of apprentices. As25 Most often the Ministry of Economics and Energy, but for some occupations it 
should be proposed to another ministry (e.g. Ministry of Environment). 
t
m
t
te analyze ﬁve occupations that were modernized twice in the re-
pective time period, we include a control dummy for the second
odernization and interaction terms indicating whether or not the
econd modernization was associated with more (or less) hetero-
eneity. 
The estimation results show that most of the time curricu-
um modernizations as such are not signiﬁcantly associated with
rms ‘demand for apprentices. Nonetheless, as the data source
s a full census, the non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients can also be in-
erpreted meaningfully. 26 The coeﬃcient suggests that moderniza-
ions are slightly positively associated to ﬁrms’ demand for appren-
ices. Considering the ﬁrst modernizations, which make up 93% of
ll modernizations, a modernization as such is associated to an
ncrease of the ﬁrms’ demand with 56 apprentices, which corre-
ponds to 2% of the average number of demanded apprentices be-
ore the modernizations. 27 
Including the interaction variables on whether the moderniza-
ions were associated with more or less heterogeneity decreases
he coeﬃcient for the ﬁrst modernizations. The coeﬃcient for
odernizations creating more heterogeneity is positive and signif-
cant at the 5% level. Considering the average demand for appren-
ices of 2215, the coeﬃcient for the ﬁrst modernization implies a
ubstantial increase of 14% in ﬁrms’ demand for apprentices. 
This shows that modernizations of the curriculum only success-
ully increase the demand for apprentices if ﬁrms receive more op-
ortunities to adapt the training to their needs. These results con-
rm hypothesis 2 and reject hypothesis 1. Moreover, they support
he theory that the positive effect of modernizations on a ﬁrm’s
emand for apprentices is indeed channeled via the ﬁrm’s post
raining beneﬁts and not via the training costs. Training could be-
ome less costly after any modernization, but it is only the hetero-
eneity which leads to an increased wedge between productivity
nd wages. 
The estimation results also show that modernizations that re-
uce the heterogeneity in the curriculum decrease the demand for
pprentices by 209, which is a decrease of 9%. We also test for a
eparate effect of merged occupations by including a variable indi-
ating whether the modernization consisted of a merger of occupa-
ions (column 3). The results show that the negative effect of less
eterogeneity is mainly due to modernizations that combined sev-
ral occupations into one. Including this control variable, the coef-
cient for less heterogeneity increases and the coeﬃcient for the
erge of occupation is −336 and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. 
Table 3 also shows the estimation results on the supply of ap-
rentices (columns 4–6). These results seem to be rather similar
o the estimation results on ﬁrms’ demand for apprentices. 28 Mod-
rnizations as such appear to have an insigniﬁcant effect on the
upply of apprentices. Thus, we have to reject hypothesis 3. How-
ver, students are more likely to apply for occupations that pro-
ide more heterogeneity in the training curriculum as the coeﬃ-
ient for more heterogeneity in the curricula is positive (205) and
igniﬁcant. When comparing these results to the estimation results
or the demand for apprentices, one can see that the former coef-
cients are slightly smaller (at least for the ﬁrst modernizations).
his suggests that the supply of apprentices is less sensitive to hav-he majority of all ﬁrms that supply apprenticeships also ﬁnd apprentices whereas 
ost students who would like to have an apprenticeship ﬁnd one. When we regress 
he number of new apprenticeship contracts (i.e., matched supply and demand) on 
he same explanatory variables, the estimation results are also very similar. 
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Table 3 
FE-regressions: demand for and supply of apprentices. 
Demand for apprentices Supply of apprentices 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Modernized (before/after) 55.68 15.55 15.48 41.49 -0.94 8.06 
(1.32) (0.25) (0.25) (0.83) ( −0.01) (0.12) 
More heterogeneity 317.83 ∗∗ 318.62 ∗∗ 205.47 ∗ 204.75 ∗
(3.23) (3.24) (2.26) (2.25) 
Less heterogeneity -209.41 ∗ -38.24 -57.68 3.22 
( −2.01) ( −0.28) ( −0.59) (0.03) 
Merge of occupations -335.53 ∗ -125.60 
( −2.00) ( −0.77) 
Constant 166 ,445.89 155 ,262.24 156 ,608.42 186 ,269.15 179 ,077.74 179 ,463.72 
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
Occupation-speciﬁc year trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for second modernizations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of occupations 265 265 265 265 265 265 
Observations 2843 2843 2843 2843 2843 2843 
R 2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.79 0.80 0.80 
Note: Occupation ﬁxed-effects regressions. T-statistics in parentheses, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Regression additionally 
controls for year dummies and name changes (in the supply regressions). 
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30 The results remain also robust when we control for the three years before the 
modernization. Results are available upon request. 
31 We here tested whether the pre-treatment supply and demand trends of all 
occupations that have been modernized after the year 2008 differ from the sup- 
ply and demand trends of the occupations that have not been modernized in our 
research period by regressing demand and supply on a dummy variable, which indi- 
cates whether the occupation has been modernized, a time trend and an interaction ng more heterogeneity in the curriculum than the ﬁrm’s demand
or apprentices. 
Moreover, modernizations which lead to more homogeneous
urricula are not signiﬁcantly related to the supply of apprentices.
he positive coeﬃcient of more heterogeneity could suggest that
ore choice options always enhance the graduates’ productivity. 
.2. Robustness tests 
.2.1. Only a temporary effect? 
In order to test whether the effect of the modernization is par-
icularly large in the ﬁrst year after the modernization and levels
ff in the following years, we created a variable which is one for
he immediate year after the modernization and zero in all other
ears. We further created two variables indicating the interaction
etween the ﬁrst year after the modernization and the change to-
ard more or less heterogeneity. The variables are again 1 for the
ear immediately after the modernization that leads to more (or
ess) heterogeneity and zero in all other years. We estimated the
wo baseline regressions for supply and demand (shown again in
olumns 1 and 4 of Table 4 ), respectively, 29 including these control
ariables (see columns 2 and 5 of Table 4 ). The estimation results
how that the ﬁrst year after the modernization does not have an
dditional signiﬁcant effect on ﬁrms’ demand for or the supply of
pprentices. Moreover, in both the supply and demand regressions,
he estimation results on the effects of modernization remain ro-
ust showing that more heterogeneity in the curriculum increases
oth demand for and supply of apprentices. 
.2.2. Anticipation effect before the modernization 
The increase in supply and demand after modernizations that
ncrease curriculum heterogeneity could also be due to a dip in
he supply and/or demand in the year before the modernization, if
rms and students anticipated the modernization and postponed
he training to the next year when the modernized curriculum was
ntroduced. To test whether this could be a driver of the effects of
he modernization, we also added a dummy variable for the year
mmediately before the modernization to the baseline regression.
gain, we also construct interaction terms, which differentiate be-
ween modernizations creating more and less heterogeneity. The
stimation results presented in Table 4 (columns 3 and 6) show29 If we take the regression in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3 as baseline regressions, 
ncluding these control variables has similar effects. 
t
2hat the coeﬃcients for modernization creating more heterogeneity
ven become larger, whereas the coeﬃcients of the dummy vari-
ble for the last year before the modernization with more hetero-
eneity are also signiﬁcantly positive. This suggests that ﬁrms al-
eady tend to increase their demand for apprentices 1 year before
he modernization anticipating that the training curricula will be
odernized and more choice options will be introduced. 30 
Moreover, we tested for different pre-treatment time trends of
he demand for and supply of apprentices in occupations that have
een modernized in comparison to demand and supply in occu-
ations that have not been modernized. 31 The estimation results
how that there is no signiﬁcant difference in the pre-treatment
rends between the modernized and not modernized occupations.
dditionally, we did a similar test for different pre-treatment time
rends of the demand for and supply of apprentices in occupations
n which the modernization lead to more heterogeneity in the cur-
iculum. Again, we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference in the pre-
reatment trends between the occupations in which the curricu-
um became more heterogeneous and the not modernized occupa-
ions. 32 
Finally, we also did a placebo test to test whether apprentice-
hip demand was reduced in the years before the modernizations
hat lead to more heterogeneity as an anticipation effect. We there-
ore assumed that the modernization took place 4 years before the
ctual modernization year, and created a placebo dummy variable
hat is 1 for all 4 years after the assumed modernization year. A
if-in-Dif analysis between the falsely treated (modernized) occu-
ations and the other occupations shows that there is no signif-
cant difference in the demand for and supply of apprentices be-
ween the years before and after the placebo modernization. 33 erm of the two variables. Estimation results are available upon request. 
32 Estimation results are available upon request. 
33 We here again focused on the modernizations that took place after the year 
008. Estimation results are available upon request. 
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Table 4 
FE-regressions: demand for and supply of apprentices (robustness tests). 
Demand for apprentices Supply of apprentices 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Modernized (before/after) 15.55 21.00 -0.16 -1.09 -26.52 -61.47 
(0.25) (0.29) ( −0.00) ( −0.02) ( −0.35) ( −0.69) 
More heterogeneity 317.83 ∗∗ 322.40 ∗∗ 646.90 ∗∗∗ 209.72 ∗ 209.49 ∗ 537.94 ∗∗∗
(3.23) (2.80) (4.56) (2.31) (1.97) (4.11) 
Less heterogeneity -209.41 ∗ -225.64 -275.84 -61.32 -46.25 51.29 
( −2.01) ( −1.81) ( −1.79) ( −0.63) ( −0.40) (0.36) 
First year after modernization -10.16 -6.19 47.19 54.07 
( −0.14) ( −0.08) (0.70) (0.80) 
First after modernization with more heterogeneity -9.05 -80.90 1.57 -71.08 
( −0.08) ( −0.72) (0.02) ( −0.68) 
First after modernization with less heterogeneity 29.31 34.48 -28.64 -45.85 
(0.24) (0.28) ( −0.25) ( −0.40) 
Last year before modernization -30.50 -53.47 
( −0.39) ( −0.75) 
Last year before modernization with more heterogeneity 459.38 ∗∗∗ 466.84 ∗∗∗
(3.79) (4.17) 
Last year before modernization with less heterogeneity -73.59 142.31 
( −0.55) (1.15) 
Constant 155 ,262 155 ,514 157 ,810 179 ,003 176 ,230 177 ,376 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
Number of occupations 265 265 265 265 265 265 
Observations 2843 2843 2843 2843 2843 2843 
R 2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Note: Occupation ﬁxed-effects regressions controlling for anticipation and short-term effects. Regression controls for year dummies, name 
changes, and occupation-speciﬁc year trends, and second modernizations. T-statistics are in parentheses, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c  
p  
p  
e  
o  
l  
m  
t  
c
 
c  
t  
n  
d  
a  
i  
t  
s  
c  
i  
w  
w  
t  
i  
i  
t
A
 
W  
g8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we make use of the modernizations of training
curricula to ﬁnd the effects of creating more or less heterogeneity
in the contents of a training curriculum on the demand for and
supply of apprentices. 
We ﬁnd that a modernization of the curriculum in itself does
not increase the demand for and supply of apprentices. However,
modernizations that lead to more heterogeneity in the training cur-
riculum increase both the demand for and the supply of appren-
tices in the occupation. 
The positive effect on the ﬁrms’ demand for apprentices can be
explained as follows. A modernization, which enables ﬁrms to ﬁt
the curriculum more closely to the speciﬁc requirements of their
production process, improves the match between the content of
the curriculum and ﬁrms’ training needs. This makes it likely that
apprenticeship training becomes more effective and graduated ap-
prentices more productive. Firms could then expect higher post-
training beneﬁts from their apprentices. Moreover, more speciﬁc
curricula could also increase the market power of ﬁrms, which en-
ables them to pay wages that are below workers’ productivity. And
last but not least, ﬁrms might beneﬁt from lower net training costs
because more speciﬁc training will be more in line with the ﬁrms’
production process. 
The ﬁnding that a more heterogeneous curriculum also in-
creases the supply of apprentices could be explained by a positive
effect on skilled worker wages because of the apprentices’ higher
productivity as they acquire more skills that they can apply in their
job. 34 This positive effect appears to overrule the potentially neg-
ative effect due to their lower market power because of the more
specialized training (see Section 4.2 ). 
Our ﬁnding that modernizations leading to more heterogeneity
are more likely to take place in larger occupations suggests that
these modernizations could be less beneﬁcial for small training oc-34 The available data does not allow us to estimate the effect of heterogeneity on 
skilled worker wages. 
Aupations. This could particularly hold when the employment op-
ortunities of a vocational training become too small from the ap-
rentice’s perspective. From this we might conclude that it is ben-
ﬁcial for both ﬁrms and apprentices to create suﬃciently large
ccupations, but allowing for specialization options within these
arge occupations. It should however be noted that the more recent
odernizations leading to more heterogeneity in the curriculum
ook place in smaller occupations. The latter suggests that speciﬁc
haracteristics of occupations are also relevant here. 
It should also be noted that our ﬁnding that having suﬃcient
hoice options in the training curriculum is important for the at-
ractiveness of a curriculum for both ﬁrms and apprentices, does
ot exclude that it might also be important to ensure certain stan-
ardization, because too much heterogeneity will give graduated
pprentices very few chances outside their training ﬁrm. Our ﬁnd-
ngs suggest that the modernizations that lead to more specializa-
ion did retain suﬃcient standardization. Probably also for ﬁrms,
ome standardization of the contents of the training curriculum
ould have positive effects because having too much heterogeneity
n the curriculum would restrict their possibilities to recruit skilled
orkers from other ﬁrms. The number of suitable skilled workers
ould then fully depend on the ﬁrm’s own engagement in appren-
iceship training. Our ﬁndings show that the modernizations that
ncreased heterogeneity in the curricula of apprenticeship training
n Germany retained suﬃcient standardization to prevent these po-
ential adverse effects. 
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Table A1 
Modernizations leading to less heterogeneity. 
Year Occupation Number and type of choice options 
Before modernization After modernization Merger 
2005 Building materials tester Disciplines (1 out of 3) Priority topics (1 out of 3) No 
Industrial ceramist, decorative engineering Disciplines (2 out of 2) Mono-occupation No 
Textile production mechanic 12 predecessor occupations Mono-occupation Yes 
Textile product ﬁnisher 2 predecessor occupations Mono-occupation Yes 
Saddler 4 predecessor occupations Disciplines (1 out of 3) Yes 
Tourism services management clerk Disciplines (1 out of 2) + ﬁelds of 
application (1 out of 3) 
Fields of application (1 out of 3) No 
2006 Port boatman 2 predecessor occupations Mono-occupation Yes 
Wood mechanic Disciplines (1 out of 6) Disciplines (1 out of 2) No 
Media agent for digital and print media Priority topics (1 out of 2) Mono-occupation No 
Builder of stoves and air heating systems 2 predecessor occupations Mono-occupation Yes 
2008 Protection and safety specialist Fields of application (1 out of 4) Mono-occupation No 
2009 Technical model-maker 2 predecessor occupations Disciplines (1 out of 3) Yes 
2010 Paper technologist Disciplines (1 out of 2) 52 weeks Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 out of 
12) 26 weeks 
No 
2011 Screen print media technologist Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 out of 
5) + (2 out of 8) + (1 out of 7) (44 
weeks) 
Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 out of 
11) + (1 out of 7) (52 weeks) 
No 
2013 Skilled metal worker 11 predecessor occupations Disciplines (1 out of 4) Yes 
Aircraft electronics technician Fields of application (1 out of 5) Fields of application (1 out of 4) No 
Motor vehicle mechatronics technician 2 predecessor occupations Priority topics (1 out of 5) Yes 
Designer of digital and print media 4 predecessor occupations Disciplines (1 out of 3) Yes 
2014 Oﬃce Manager 3 predecessor occupations Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 from 
10) 
Yes 
Technologist in confectionery goods Disciplines (1 out of 3) Fields of application (1 out of 5) No 
Motor vehicle body and vehicle 
construction mechanic 
Disciplines (1 out of 3) Disciplines (1 out of 2) No 
Table A2 
Modernizations leading to more heterogeneity. 
Year Occupation Number and type of choice options 
Before modernization After modernization 
2005 Butcher Disciplines (1 out of 3) Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 out of 6) 
Surface coater Mono-occupation (3 alternatives) Mono-occupation (4 alternatives) 
Animal caretaker Mono-occupation Discipline (1 out of 5) 
2006 Salesperson specializing in foodstuffs Priority topics (1 out of 2) Priority topics (1 out of 3) 
Property agent Mono-occupation Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 out of 5) 
Insurance and ﬁnancial services broker Mono-occupation with elective 
modules (2 out of 3 modules) 
Disciplines (1 out of 2) 
Media designer for images and sound Mono-occupation Fields of application (1 out of 10) 
Mechanic in plastics and rubber processing Mono-occupation with 4 priority topics Mono-occupation with 6 priority topics 
2007 Management assistant for retail services Elective qualiﬁcation units (1 out of 
4) + (4 out of 7) 
Elective qualiﬁcation units (1 out of 
4) + (4 out of 8) 
2008 Hairdresser Mono-occupation Elective qualiﬁcation units (1 out of 5) 
2009 Mining technologist Mono-occupation Disciplines (1 out of 2) 
Photographer Mono-occupation Priority topics (1 out of 4) 
Industrial ceramist Disciplines (1 out of 3) Elective qualiﬁcation units (1 out of 6) 
Specialist retail assistant for the music branch Mono-occupation Elective qualiﬁcation units (1 out of 3) 
2010 Precision machinist Priority topics (1 out of 3) Priority topics (1 out of 4) 
Equine manager Priority topics (1 out of 4) Disciplines (1 out of 5) 
Boat builder Mono-occupation Disciplines (1 out of 2) 
Bookbinder Disciplines (1 out of 3) Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 out of 
9) + (1 out of 2) 
Bookseller Priority topics (1 out of 3) Elective qualiﬁcation units (1 out of 3) 
2011 Print media technologist Disciplines (1 out of 4) Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 out of 
21 + 1 out of 13) 
Packaging materials technologist Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 out of 8) Elective qualiﬁcation units (2 out of 
4) + (2 out of 6) 
Tourism services management clerk Fields of application (1 out of 3) Elective qualiﬁcation units (1 out of 3) 
2012 Luminous advertisement maker Mono-occupation Priority topics (1 out of 2) 
Mechanic in plastics and rubber processing Priority topics (1 out of 6) Disciplines (1 out of 7) 
2013 Orthopedic technician Mono-occupation Priority topics (1 out of 3) 
Materials tester Mono-occupation Disciplines (1 out of 4) 
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Table A3 
Demand for and supply of apprentices in the year before modernizations leading to less heterogeneity. 
Year of modernization Demand Supply 
Building materials tester 2005 180 179 
Industrial ceramist, decorative engineering 2005 39 42 
Textile production mechanic 2005 486 495 
Textile product ﬁnisher 2005 246 238 
Saddler 2005 162 162 
Tourism services management clerk 2005 2832 3060 
Port boatman 2006 21 21 
Wood mechanic 2006 1401 1450 
Media agent for digital and print media 2006 836 855 
Builder of stoves and air heating systems 2006 145 139 
Protection and safety specialist 2008 1140 1203 
Technical model-maker 2009 482 480 
Paper technologist 2010 213 214 
Screen print media technologist 2011 148 148 
Skilled metal worker 2013 1133 1162 
Aircraft electronics technician 2013 118 118 
Motor vehicle mechatronics technician 2013 22,109 22,226 
Designer of digital and print media 2013 3704 3925 
Motor vehicle body and vehicle construction mechanic 2014 1446 1420 
Oﬃce Manager 2014 31,578 32,648 
Technologist in confectionery goods 2014 92 90 
Table A4 
Demand for and supply of apprentices in the year before modernizations leading to more heterogeneity. 
Year of modernization Demand Supply 
Butcher 2005 3564 3484 
Surface coater 2005 285 270 
Animal caretaker 2005 585 602 
Salesperson specializing in foodstuffs 2006 12,865 12,585 
Property agent 2006 2104 2138 
Insurance and ﬁnancial services broker 2006 5299 5219 
Media designer for images and sound 2006 631 773 
Mechanic in plastics and rubber processing 2006 2161 2189 
Management assistant for retail services 2007 32,666 36,848 
Hairdresser 2008 18,371 19,460 
Mining technologist 2009 79 76 
Photographer 2009 864 909 
Industrial ceramist 2009 43 43 
Specialist retail assistant for the music branch 2009 33 35 
Precision machinist 2010 2819 2805 
Equine manager 2010 920 929 
Boat builder 2011 127 127 
Bookbinder 2011 425 416 
Bookseller 2011 677 685 
Print media technologist 2011 1073 1060 
Packaging materials technologist 2011 478 473 
Tourism services management clerk 2011 2001 2022 
Luminous advertisement maker 2012 419 413 
Mechanic in plastics and rubber processing 2012 2813 2720 
Orthopedic technician 2013 479 471 
Materials tester 2013 385 382 
Table A5 
Average demand for apprentices for different types of modernizations. 
Average demand for apprentices Std. Dev. Frequency 
Never being modernized 1955 3746 1967 
Only one modernization 2419 5766 821 
Two modernizations 8482 11,827 55 
Less heterogeneity 3650 8967 220 
Modernization (no change in het.) 1857 3768 392 
More heterogeneity 3492 7007 264 
No modernization 1955 3746 1967 
Total 2215 4772 2843 
Note: Average demand refers to the total time period from 2004 to 2014; the second part of the table only refers 
to the ﬁrst modernization. 
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